Dear Secretary Becerra and Administrator Brooks-LaSure:
Social Security Works, Just Care USA and Center for Health and Democracy are delighted that the Biden Administration seeks to protect older adults, people with disabilities and the Medicare program from abuses in the Medicare Advantage program. We thank you for the opportunity to comment on ways to improve Medicare Advantage. We agree with the HHS Office of the Inspector General, Government Accountability Office and MedPac that Medicare Advantage is in need of major reform to ensure the health and well-being of enrollees, promote health equity, and minimize legal violations, Including overpayments. As GAO reported: “The Medicare program, which includes MA, is on GAO’s High Risk List, because of its size, complexity, and susceptibility to mismanagement and improper payments.”
The health insurers offering Medicare Advantage plans have committed many hundreds of legal violations since 2000, and there is reason to believe these will continue unless the federal government overhauls Medicare Advantage. UnitedHealth Group, the company with the most MA enrollees, has paid nearly $600 million in penalties for 332 violations, 300 of which are for consumer protection-related offenses, since 2000. Humana, the second largest MA plan, has paid more than $77 million in penalties for 79 violations, 57 of which are for consumer protection-related offenses, since 2000. CVS Health, the third largest MA plan, has paid more than $1.6 billion in penalties for 463 violations, 236 of which are for consumer protection-related offenses, since 2000.
Today, the MA plans have too much incentive and opportunity for abuse. In September 2019, Senator Sherrod Brown, along with five other Senators, wrote CMS requesting answers to questions regarding key failings in Medicare Advantage. To our knowledge, three years later, CMS has not addressed any of the serious issues raised. Unless MA is overhauled on multiple fronts, including revising the way it pays them, Medicare Advantage plans will continue to undermine the integrity of the Medicare Trust Fund, harm health equity, and put millions of their enrollees at serious risk of harm.
As soon as possible, CMS should stop misdirecting people to believe they can meaningfully choose a Medicare Advantage plan that meets their needs and that they can rely on a misleading star-rating system to choose among MA plans. CMS should:
- Educate people about the high out-of-pocket costs in MA;
- Educate people about MA plans’ torturous prior authorization rules;
- Identify and publicly report the names of MA plans with high rates of delays and denials;
- Identify and publicly report adjusted mortality rates per MA plan;
- Terminate contracts with MA plans that are consistently delaying and denying care inappropriately, have high mortality rates, or otherwise are violating their contractual obligations.
People from racial and ethnic minority groups, people with disabilities and serious health conditions, people of disadvantaged socioeconomic status, people with limited English proficiency, and people from rural communities disproportionately choose Medicare Advantage because of its low upfront cost. They are, however, at greater risk in Medicare Advantage than in traditional Medicare for two key reasons:
- Copays and deductibles impose a financial barrier to care, forcing the most vulnerable MA enrollees to go without needed care;
- Referral and prior authorization requirements, narrow networks, and widespread and persistent inappropriate delays and denials of care and coverage endanger care access for everyone, particularly vulnerable MA enrollees.
Fundamental problems with the current Medicare Advantage model drive health inequities and poor health outcomes for people with complex conditions. The biggest problem is the risk-adjusted capitated payment model. Medicare Advantage plans that: 1. Attract a disproportionate number of enrollees in relatively good health and/or 2. Delay and deny care inappropriately and/or 3. Do not include high quality specialists and specialty hospitals in their networks, can be sure to profit handsomely. The risk-adjusted capitated payment model for MA plans not only hurt vulnerable populations, they drive up Medicare costs.
We propose a suite of ten changes to improve health equity, reduce Medicare Advantage threats, enable appropriate CMS oversight, and minimize health insurer violations in Medicare Advantage.
1. Change the way the government pays Medicare Advantage plans.
The government should pay MA plans so that they do not have a financial disincentive to cover care for people with costly and complex conditions. Prospective payments, unrelated to actual medical claims, create a powerful financial incentive for MA plans to impede access to high-value care for enrollees with complex conditions in order to maximize profits. This is particularly corrosive to health equity:
- MA plans can maximize profits by enrolling a disproportionate number of people in good health and impeding care for people in poor health. This is one reason why MA plans seldom contract with Centers of Excellence and rarely, if ever, advertise or promote programs for people with costly conditions.
- MA plans can maximize profits by underpaying providers. The Texas Hospital Association has identified that “the rapid growth of Medicare Advantage enrollees threatens Texas’ health care safety net. For rural hospitals, Medicare Advantage causes financial instability on an already fragile provider community.”
In theory, a risk-adjusted capitated model would pay MA plans enough to cover the cost of services their members need. In reality, however, capitated risk-adjusted models can never ensure access to timely and good quality care for people with costly and complex conditions. In a world in which 50 percent of the Medicare population accounts for less than five percent of spending, such models wildly overpay for the healthy and significantly underpay for the sick.
Capitated risk-adjusted models create a powerful incentive for Medicare Advantage plans to “cherry pick” the healthy enrollees and “lemon drop” the sick ones. Any Medicare Advantage plan that meets the needs of people with costly conditions — where demand for high-value care is the greatest — is at risk of attracting a disproportionately high percentage of enrollees with costly conditions and suffering financially. Ten percent of people with Medicare with the most serious conditions account for 60 percent of Medicare spending. It makes business sense for MA plans to do what they can to minimize costs from this population. Even good actors must engage in “cherry picking” and “lemon dropping” to ensure they remain financially afloat.
2. Base payments to MA plans upon the cost of services MA plans cover plus a reasonable fee for administration and a global cap.
Risk-adjusting capitation payments based upon an MA plan’s own proprietary assessment of the health of its enrollees creates a powerful financial incentive for the plans to “upcode” or attach as many diagnosis codes as possible to its enrollees. The more diagnosis codes, the higher an MA plan’s payments, and the greater the cost to the Medicare program.
Upcoding is not simply about bad actors. In order for “good guy” MA plans to compete with “bad guy” MA plans, the good guys are hard-pressed not to engage in upcoding. Otherwise, their competitors have more resources to offer reduced premiums and additional benefits, driving the “good guy” MA plans out of the market.
The Department of Justice has identified more than $100 billion of such inappropriate upcoding and overbilling at UnitedHealth Group, Humana, Cigna, Kaiser, Sutter Health and Anthem, among other insurers. It’s anyone’s guess how many additional billions of dollars in overpayments have gone undetected. As a result of upcoding, CMS is projected to overpay Medicare Advantage plans an estimated $600 billion between 2023 and 2031.
CMS should acknowledge that it does not have the tools or resources to ensure the diagnosis codes MA plans assign their enrollees are accurate, much less to recoup overpayments.
Risk-adjusted capitation adds additional administrative costs and profits to a fee-for-service model. More than 81 percent of MA plans pay all or nearly all their network providers on a fee-for-service basis. Traditional Medicare’s fee-for-service payment model is far more cost-effective and transparent than the MA capitated payment model. Researchers can see what’s working and not working in the health care system, unlike in MA, and drive system improvements. CMS should be building on that payment model.
3. Require Medicare Advantage plans that pay providers on a fee-for-service basis to use traditional Medicare’s fee schedule.
Allowing Medicare Advantage plans to pay lower rates to providers jeopardizes access to care in MA and undermines health equity. Safety net providers serving vulnerable communities, in particular, have little if any leverage to contest MA plan rates and few resources to challenge inappropriate denials of care and coverage, undermining health equity. The Texas Hospital Association has identified that MA plans pay Texas hospitals well below the traditional Medicare rate, which undermines federal payment policies intended to ensure adequate reimbursement for rural hospitals. Medicare Advantage has caused some Texas hospitals to lose several hundred thousand dollars in revenue a year that they had received from traditional Medicare.
Conversely, allowing MA plans to pay higher rates than traditional Medicare creates an unlevel playing field with traditional Medicare and drives up Medicare spending needlessly.
4. Require MA plans to include all centers of excellence in their networks and disclose out-of-pocket costs for people with complex conditions.
The data suggest notable dissatisfaction among MA plan enrollees who need costly care. They disenroll from Medicare Advantage plans at disproportionately high rates in the last year of life and when medical costs are high. A 2021 GAO report suggests that these high disenrollment rates “may indicate potential issues with beneficiary access to care or with the quality of care provided.” In addition, rural enrollees have substantial rates of switching out of Medicare Advantage to traditional Medicare. The data also show widespread and persistent inappropriate delays and denials of care.
Until CMS moves away from a risk-adjusted capitated payment model, it must ensure that every MA plan meets the needs of people with the costliest and most complex conditions. Among other things, every MA plan should include all centers of excellence, such as NCI-designated Cancer Centers, in its network. And, rather than allowing MA plans to spend rebate dollars on additional benefits with no evidence of promoting health equity, CMS should consider establishing a mechanism for this money to go towards covering copays and deductibles for people with complex conditions so as to help ensure they are not forced to choose between their rent and their health care.
5. Standardize MA coverage rules and cost-sharing design.
Even the most diligent people with Medicare have no way to select the MA plan that best meets their needs. Each Medicare Advantage plan structures its out-of-pocket costs and out-of-pocket limits in different ways, uses different medical necessity protocols, different referral and prior authorization requirements, designs different networks, and engages in different levels of inappropriate denials of care and coverage. Consequently, some Medicare Advantage plans could literally be harming their enrollees while others could be ensuring timely access to care and delivering good health outcomes. No one can meaningfully differentiate among these plans.
These structural differences among MA plans, several of which can change at any time, could be disabling or even killing people with Medicare prematurely – and CMS itself would not know. These differences prevent CMS from both protecting enrollees and evaluating MA plans in a meaningful way. At the same time, they prevent people with Medicare from being able to compare MA plans on the most essential metrics.
Structural differences also make it all but impossible for CMS to undertake timely and effective audits of MA plans. CMS has not been able to complete timely MA audits from as far back as 2011. Without such audits, CMS cannot protect enrollees in MA plans or hold MA plans appropriately accountable for their bad acts in a timely fashion. CMS should acknowledge that it will never have the tools or resources to appropriately penalize MA plans for bad acts and protect MA enrollees without standardized MA design.
People with Medicare today are inadequately protected against proprietary and non-standardized MA policies that could jeopardize their health and well-being. The data show that CMS cannot effectively monitor them for poor outcomes. A 2022 OIG report, a 2018 OIG report, and endless news stories consistently show that Medicare Advantage plans too often inappropriately deny care that traditional Medicare would have covered and that the MA plans should have covered. CMS should require all MA plans to follow traditional Medicare coverage protocols and only allow evidence-based and transparent differences among MA plan protocols.
6. Ensure appropriate oversight of MA.
CMS does not have the tools or resources to ensure appropriate Medicare Advantage oversight and protect enrollees under the current non-standardized model. Standardizing coverage policies would allow CMS to monitor MA plans more effectively and better protect enrollees. Standardized coverage protocols would help ensure MA plans covered medically necessary care and promoted health equity.
The GAO has found that CMS has not validated MA patient encounter data as needed and recommended. In a recent House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations hearing, MedPAC reported that “After a decade, MA plans are “not producing complete and accurate enough records needed for MedPAC to conduct oversight activities, to understand differences in service use between MA and FFS, to reflect utilization management techniques, and inappropriate denial of covered care.”
The failure of Medicare Advantage plans to turn over complete and accurate encounter data for analysis — as required by law — suggests these plans either lack the tools to collect the data or the ability to appropriately manage their enrollees’ care.
7. Do not assume value in MA, since it cannot be measured.
MedPAC has said repeatedly that MA quality cannot be measured. “The current state of quality reporting in MA is such that the Commission can no longer provide an accurate description of the quality of care in MA. With 43 percent of eligible Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in MA plans, good information on the quality of care MA enrollees receive and how that quality compares with quality in FFS Medicare is necessary for proper evaluation. The ability to compare MA and FFS quality and to compare quality among MA plans is also important for beneficiaries. Recognizing that the current quality program is not achieving its intended purposes and is costly to Medicare, in its June 2020 report the Commission recommended a new value incentive program for MA that would replace the current quality bonus program.” Medicare Advantage plans’ higher per enrollee costs than traditional Medicare suggest Medicare Advantage offers less value than traditional Medicare.
We know that MA plans spend less money on medical care than traditional Medicare. But, we do not know to what extent they are failing to cover appropriate medically necessary care that traditional Medicare covers. Moreover, industry data on 2018 hospital stays and emergency room visits reveal that Medicare Advantage appears to have greater inpatient use and emergency room visits than traditional Medicare. In a review of the Medicare Advantage studies, Agarwal and colleagues find “the evidence on readmission rates, mortality, experience of care, and racial/ethnic disparities did not show a trend of better performance in MA plans than traditional Medicare, despite the higher payments to MA plans.”
Assessing MA plan quality is critical for the health and well-being of MA enrollees. Given the poor performance of some MA plans with four and five-star ratings and no information from CMS on bad actors with these ratings, people are at risk of worsened health outcomes if they choose the wrong MA plan. One MA analysis in NBER found that if CMS cancelled contracts with the worst performing five percent of MA plans, it would save 10,000 lives a year.
To protect people from misleading quality information, CMS should revise its star-rating system, as proposed by MedPAC. It should also eliminate star ratings for all Medicare Advantage plans that do not release complete and accurate encounter data, as required. And, it should consider removing these MA plans from eligibility for the quality bonus program.
8. Rethink Medicare Advantage networks.
CMS should stop allowing Medicare Advantage plans, except those that are fully integrated health systems, to design their own provider networks and require them to cover care from all Medicare providers. Many if not most MA plans design their networks to minimize their costs and boost their profits to the detriment of the health and well-being of their enrollees. To our knowledge, no independent expert has ever demonstrated the value of a network in Medicare Advantage plans to people with Medicare or the Medicare program other than those in fully integrated health systems. Conversely, stories abound about Medicare Advantage narrow networks that jeopardize access to care and lead to poor health outcomes, particularly for vulnerable populations.
If the principal reason for a provider network is to contain medical costs, there is no compelling justification for Medicare Advantage plan networks. MA plans generally piggyback off of Medicare rates, which are already relatively low. If MA plans negotiate even lower rates, there’s good cause for concern that providers in their networks are of lesser quality than in traditional Medicare. If the principal reason for a provider network is to ensure good integrated care, it is difficult to appreciate the value of MA provider networks (except in cases where the Medicare Advantage plan is a fully integrated health care system).
The risks to the health and well-being of MA enrollees of allowing MA plans to design their provider networks are grave. Compared to traditional Medicare, the data show that MA plans use lower quality home health agencies and nursing homes, and less frequently use higher quality hospitals. They often do not include NCI-designated Cancer Centers or Centers of Excellence. In 2016, the Kaiser Family Foundation found that only 15 percent of Medicare Advantage plans definitely included Cancer Centers and 41 percent definitely did not.
Plan networks are often so narrow as to delay or prevent people from accessing needed care. They also often undermine continuity of care. And, many MA plans have never had accurate network directories. Plan provider directories are too often misleading and inaccurate. Without accurate directories, network adequacy cannot be established.
Moreover, GAO reports that CMS does not assess provider availability to the extent it oversees network adequacy. This failure undermines health equity. Vulnerable older adults and people with disabilities are more likely to go without care when networks are narrow and accessing care with network providers requires significant time and travel.
We urge CMS to acknowledge that it has neither the tools nor the resources to ensure network adequacy and promote health equity. A 2015 GAO report found “that CMS’s oversight did not ensure that MAO networks were adequate to meet the care needs of MA enrollees. For example, we found that CMS did not adequately verify the accuracy of provider network information submitted by MAOs, and accordingly could not verify whether MAO networks were in compliance with the agency’s provider network criteria.” In June 2022, GAO stated that its recommendations to address these issues “had not yet been fully implemented.”
To promote health equity, protect people from misleading MA marketing regarding network providers, and ensure access to and continuity of care, CMS should consider requiring MA plans, except fully integrated health systems, to cover care from all Medicare providers. At a minimum, CMS should require those plans that do not keep their directories up to date to open their networks to all Medicare providers.
9. Rethink key consumer information regarding Medicare Advantage and overhaul MA marketing to minimize deception.
CMS should ensure that people enrolling in a Medicare Advantage plan are able to identify which of those plans are the bad actors, if not cancel contracts with these bad actors. Allowing these bad actors to continue offering MA plans endangers the health of the most vulnerable people with Medicare and undermines health equity.
CMS also should ensure that no one enrolls in Medicare Advantage without understanding the financial and administrative barriers to care. A recent Center for Medicare Advocacy report found that even the “Medicare and You Handbook” and Medicare website do not explain out-of-pocket costs or prior authorization requirements in a balanced fashion.
CMS reported a doubling of MA marketing complaints in the year between 2020 and 2021. Too often people with Medicare have little clue what they are doing when they enroll in a Medicare Advantage plan. CMS’ review of sales calls showed significant confusion among people with Medicare, including “that the beneficiary may be unaware that they are enrolling into a new plan during these phone conversations.” Of those people who understand differences between traditional Medicare and MA, few appreciate the risks of enrolling in a Medicare Advantage plan.
10. Level the playing field with traditional Medicare and ensure health equity in MA.
We urge the government to put an out-of-pocket cap in traditional Medicare so that traditional Medicare is a meaningful choice for everyone with Medicare, including people with low incomes, people in rural communities, people from racial and ethnic minority groups, and people with complex conditions. Without that out-of-pocket cap, the hundreds of thousands of people who face inappropriate delays and denials of care in Medicare Advantage too often are deprived a meaningful choice of traditional Medicare. If they elect traditional Medicare, they expose themselves to too much financial risk because supplemental insurance is unavailable or affordable for them.
CMS should consider allowing people in MA to have supplemental coverage that picks up all out-of-pocket costs. Right now, too many enrollees, particularly the most vulnerable, are skipping or delaying critical care because they cannot afford the deductibles and copays, creating substantial health inequities. One NBER study found that a copay increase of as little as $10.40 resulted in thousands of needless deaths. Supplemental coverage would allow people to better budget for their care. Out-of-pocket costs jeopardize the health and well-being of enrollees, with particularly poor outcomes for Latinx and BIPOC communities. In addition, out-of-pocket costs present a large barrier to care for people with low incomes.
Conclusion
Medicare Advantage would be significantly improved by:
- overhauling the Medicare Advantage payment system,
- meaningfully disclosing MA encounter and other data,
- holding accountable those MA plans that violate their contracts,
- standardizing coverage policies and provider rates, including prior authorization policies,
- requiring a broad Medicare provider network, and
- overhauling Medicare Advantage marketing practices.
Without these reforms, the federal government puts the lives of the most vulnerable people with Medicare enrolled in MA at serious risk and threatens the integrity of the Medicare Trust Fund. It wrongly drives up Medicare Part B premiums for people in traditional Medicare.
Traditional Medicare would benefit from some improvements as well, including an out-of-pocket cap on Part A and B benefits and coverage of dental, hearing, vision and long-term care benefits. CMS also needs to end its Direct Contracting/ACO REACH experiment, which involuntarily assigns vulnerable people with Medicare to entities paid upfront to manage their care and is riddled with many of the same grave problems as Medicare Advantage. That said, traditional Medicare generally still provides easy access to necessary care at substantially lower cost than Medicare Advantage, and CMS should ensure that it is a meaningful choice not only for the wealthiest people with Medicare but for everyone with Medicare.
We look forward to working with CMS on Medicare improvements. Thank you for this opportunity to share our thoughts. For questions, please contact Diane Archer at [email protected].
Signed,
Diane Archer, President, Just Care USA
Alex Lawson, Executive Director, Social Security Works
Wendell Potter, President, Center for Health and Democracy